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Introduction

This book discusses sport in the context of some traditional philosophical questions. What is a good human life? To whom do we
look for ethical guidance? What is the meaning of life? (What is a
meaningful life? What makes human activities or projects meaningful?) These are big questions that have been important in the
history of philosophy. I first considered referring to “sport and big
questions” in the title, since the notions of good lives, ethical guidance, and meaning are central in the book. I came to see that a
reference to good lives was the unifying motif, and even the issue
of meaning in life could be understood to be part of a larger reflection about how to live well, what are the constituents of good
human lives, and how sport might fit into the picture. Also, whereas
the consideration of the ethics of swearing, for example, might
seem to be a puzzling addition to a book about sport and “big
questions,” the arguments involved in considering whether we
ought to cuss, inside and outside of sports, involve issues about
how best to live.
In relation to these unifying questions and issues, some of the
specific topics in the book are less surprising than others. When
thinking about the attraction and value of sports, some have empha-
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sized the role of play, as I do. Some have stressed the importance
of our sport heroes as role models who can have a positive influence on others. In contrast, it is less common to consider pessimistic views of sports that stress sport participants’ vulnerabilities, the
ethics of swearing, coaches who use their authority to offer sage
advice to their players about how to live well (coach as sage), and
the conditions on the basis of which we consider lives and activities meaningful—with an eye toward the contribution of sports to
meaningful lives.
In the first part of the book, I begin by examining the extensive
literature on play. I show that play resists a simple or parsimonious
reduction to an attitude that engages an activity for its own sake
(the common view among philosophers of sport). A pluralistic
conception of play illuminates the relation between sport and play
and the contribution of playful activities to good human lives.
Next, I examine various reasons for pessimistic views of sport. I
contrast an optimizing view of happiness, which stresses desire
satisfaction, and the strategy of adaptation found in Stoicism, Buddhism, and Taoism, which recommends wisely adapting one’s
desires to the world in order to avoid unhappiness. Given the ways
in which sport is a locus of vulnerability for participants, I argue
for a moderate form of desire adaptation, including the moderation of fans’ passionate desires for the success of their teams. This
discussion leads naturally to a more extended examination of the
ethics of supporting sports teams, which I offer in chapter 4. In
the last chapter of part 1, I examine the ethics of using dirty language, an unusual but fascinating topic. Because some of the common arguments for the elimination of cussing appeal to prudence,
social good, and virtue, it is appropriate to examine this issue in
the context of references that presuppose elements of living well.
Furthermore, because dirty language is so prevalent in the world
of sports, it is appropriate to focus on sport examples. The relevant
arguments obviously extend beyond sports, however. I distinguish
two extreme positions, the puritan rejection of swearing and the
viii
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vulgarian unqualified acceptance of potty mouth. I defend a position I call “moderate vulgarianism.” I end the chapter with some
practical suggestions.
In part 2, I critically examine the common view that celebrated
athletes are role models. I argue that the term role model is ambiguous, as are judgments that involve this notion. Once we distinguish being a role model in a narrow and a broad sense, and the
difference between making a descriptive or a normative claim
about role models, we are in a position to sort out the strengths
and weaknesses of various claims about sports heroes as role models. I end the discussion by suggesting that we should think of our
sports heroes as fictional objects that are imaginatively constructed
in the context of the sports world, rather than everyday individuals like you and me. In this part I also examine another relatively
unusual topic. Many view coaches as particularly well suited to
offer various kinds of advice about how to win games, leadership,
management skills, and so forth. Some coaches seem to think they
are in a position to offer sage advice about how to live, as if they
are more interested in the ethical development of the whole person, not simply developing the person qua athlete. Although many
have bemoaned contemporary athletes’ sense of entitlement (to
act boorishly, selfishly, even violently), few have questioned coaches’
sense of entitlement to offer ethical instruction to athletes, especially in the context of college athletics. In this chapter I offer a
discussion of a recent coach book whose pretensions are immoderate, especially when we think about such issues against the background of thoughtful advice offered in the history of philosophy,
both Western and non-Western, about how to live well. After
considering an alternative model of coaching and ethical guidance, I offer some conclusions about the proper use of coaches’
authority.
In the final part of the book I examine a topic that requires a
wide-ranging examination of the recent literature, especially in
analytic philosophy, about the question of the meaning of life. It
Introduction
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seems to be intuitively plausible to think of sports activities as
meaningful and to believe that such activities contribute to meaningful lives. It is not at all clear, however, what such claims mean.
It is rare, in popular sports-talk discourse, to raise the possibility
that sports participation is attractive and that it is so difficult for
athletes to give up their involvement in sports, because such involvements are meaningful. The common view is that athletes are motivated by a thirst for competition. I examine the less common view
that sports contribute meaning to lives. I discuss attempts to provide general accounts of meaningful lives in terms of conditions
that must be met in order for lives to be meaningful. I do this in
order to generate a broader view of the meaning of meaning in
judgments about meaningful lives and activities. I offer a somewhat
paradoxical view that the question of the meaning of life (or, rather,
the conditions under which activities and lives are meaningful) is
much less important than one might think. Meaning is everywhere.
On the other hand, sport is more important than some think
because it provides a significant space of meaning in life.
I hope the book effectively balances topics that have been a part
of scholarly philosophy of sport discussions (play, the ethics of supporting sports teams, the role-model argument) and more unusual
topics (sport and unhappiness, swearing, coach as sage, sport and
the meaning of life) that may raise new questions for both scholars
and generalists. My purpose is not only to raise questions, but also
to offer alternative ways to look at sports and different ways to
understand our attachments to these activities. As with my previous work, I confess that these philosophical reflections are personal,
in the sense that I attempt to understand my own lifelong love
affair with sport and my dissatisfaction with typical ways of talking
about and understanding sports found in our commercial culture.
There is more to sport than is suggested by the ethos that seems to
be the common denominator expressed on sports-talk radio, on
espn, and in other popular media outlets. There is more to sports
than winning, competition, and money. We need alternative vocabx
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ularies in order to understand ourselves as well as our involvements.
In stressing my existential connection to these issues, I also assume
that my own experiences as a player, coach, and fan (and university
professor) have not been wholly idiosyncratic. For example, it may
be unusual yet illuminating to attempt to develop attitudes toward
sport that involve patterns of desire adaptation described in nonWestern approaches to life, or to understand part of the attractiveness of sport by using the category of meaning rather than the usual
suspects.
Some might complain that in some cases my discussion displaces
sport as the central topic and uses it merely as an occasion to raise
questions about traditional philosophical issues (the meaning of
life) or topics that are larger than sport-specific issues (the ethics
of speech). I do not see the alternatives as mutually exclusive. In
much of the book sport is the central object of philosophical reflection. In some cases sport is used to occasion reflection on traditional
philosophical issues, yet the ultimate goal is to illuminate sport,
albeit in a somewhat more indirect way and in a manner that has
implications for life outside sport. The chapter on sport and the
question of the meaning of life requires an extended discussion of
the types of answers that have been given by philosophers. Although
the topic of sport may seem to be largely absent in that chapter
(ignoring the introductory remarks and sport-related counterexamples), the point is to provide the philosophical background for
an account of sport found in the final chapter. There, I suggest that
sport is a significant “space of meaning” in life.
I direct my book toward a diverse audience. Perhaps scholars will
find in this book something worthy to consider, and both undergraduates and graduate students might find interesting topics here.
I would be disappointed, however, if the book proved to be less
than accessible to a broader, literate audience. The Barnes and
Noble crowd will find the writing clear, and some of my examples
from contemporary sports will be familiar. They may have to work
in places to follow my arguments, but there is nothing particularly
Introduction
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esoteric in any of my discussions. If you play or have played or
coached these games, or if you find yourself often watching, listening to, or reading about these activities, I suspect you will find
something of interest here, or at least something to think about
and even contest. All of us, including sports geeks, are philosophers.

xii
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A Pluralist
Conception of Play

The philosophical and scientific literature on play is extensive, and
the approaches to the study, description, and explanation of play
are diverse. In this chapter I intend to provide an overview of
approaches to play. My interest is in describing the most fundamental categories in terms of which play is characterized, explained,
and evaluated. Insofar as these categories attempt to describe what
kind of reality we are talking about when we make claims about
play, I hope to clarify the metaphysics of play. Once this categorical scheme is made clear, we will be in a better position to evaluate
the task of definition, claims about the relation of sport and play,
and assertions about the significance of play. First, I place the discussion in the context of Bernard Suits’s account of play and some
other recent approaches to play. Next, I distinguish the following
approaches to play: play as behavior or action; play as motive, attitude, or state of mind; play as form or structure; play as meaningful experience; play as an ontologically distinctive phenomenon.
There is a natural progression in the way the analysis unfolds. In
the final section I argue that my analysis generates a pluralist, nonreductive account of play.
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i. The Question of Play
It may appear that there is very little new under the sun for a philosopher to say about play. This is in striking contrast to the growing science of play. In various scientific fields there are lively and
ongoing debates about the evolutionary and neuroscientific bases
of play, occasioning numerous research programs and new theories
about what is going on when animals and children, especially,
engage in playful behavior. Scientists seem not to be as worried
about the kinds of questions that worry philosophers, yet such
questions cannot be ignored, except by stipulation. What is play?
Can it be defined? How is it recognized? Is it good? Why is it good?
How is play related to other significant cultural activities, like art
or religion? What is the relation between sport and play? How does
play contribute to a good life?
I have been impressed recently by the differences between more
simplified accounts of play and the enormous diversity of play
phenomena that are mentioned and studied outside of philosophy
of sport by scholars in various fields. Whereas some philosophical
discussions have focused on the canonical texts written by Johan
Huizinga and Roger Caillois,¹ and have generated relatively broad
notions of play involving a variety of characteristics, others have
been suspicious of the supposed scope of play. Yet when some scientifically informed scholars have been forced to offer a definition
or a philosophical account of play, they inevitably turn to Huizinga
and offer at least a variation on a theme described in Homo Ludens.
Bernard Suits, eminent philosopher of sport and “paidiatrician,”
has produced an account of play that some philosophical scholars
of sport have largely taken for granted. His “words on play” have
been taken to be the final words, so to speak. It is against the background of his provocative early essay on play (as well as some later
comments) that I wish to rethink some issues concerning the unity
and diversity of play, its relation to sport, and its value.²
In his essay “Words on Play,” Suits combines his interest in pur2
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suing the traditional philosophical task of definition with his suspicion about claims concerning the scope of play phenomena. Why
look for a definition of play? Why attempt to overcome Wittgensteinian objections to such a task? Suits responds: “chiefly because
a definition is a kind of restriction or limitation, and I believe that,
ever since Huizinga began to find play under nearly every rock in
the social landscape, quite a bit too much has been made of the
notion.”³
Early on Suits offers three claims that are particularly relevant
for this discussion. First, he agrees with the common view that play
involves activities that are ends in themselves or desired for their
own sake. All play is autotelic, as opposed to instrumental. Autotelicity is a necessary condition of play, but he denies that all autotelic activities are instances of play. “In other words, I regard autotelicity as necessary but not sufficient for an adequate definition
of play.” Next, he denies that there is a logical relation between
playing and playing games. Despite the fact that we speak of “playing” games, he considers such usages to indicate merely that we are
participating in a game; we may or may not be playing. For example, when we speak of playing a musical instrument, we are indicating performance, not necessarily play. Sometimes game playing
is playing, but it may not be, because of the autotelicity requirement. This leads Suits to say the following (which many take to be
obvious—I don’t): “That one has to be playing in order to be playing a game seems equally implausible. When professional athletes
are performing in assigned games for wages, although they are
certainly playing games, we are not at all inclined to conclude from
that fact that they are without qualification playing. For we think
of professional athletes as working when they play their games and
as playing when they go home from work to romp with their children.” Third, Suits recognizes that his account of play (which I will
mention in a moment) is at odds with a variety of common usages,
yet he insists that such figurative or metaphorical usages are nonetheless valuable. If we combine an account that places a boundary
A Pluralist Conception of Play
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on the concept of play and an awareness of the vast array of ordinary usages of the word, we identify a helpful avenue of inquiry,
“since an explanation of how they are figurative requires a sorting
out of the respects in which the thing at issue is, and the respects
in which it is not, play or a game.”4
For Suits the sorting is relatively simple, because we merely have
to relate autotelicity (a genus) to the way we use resources in certain
activities (a specific difference). For example, little Johnny is
rebuked for playing with his food, a resource normally used for
nutrition. Here is Suits’s definition of play: “X is playing if and only
if x has made a temporary reallocation to autotelic activities of
resources primarily committed to instrumental activities.”5 According to Suits, when we temporarily reallocate any resource to intrinsically valued activities, including time or energy, we are playing.
For now, let’s turn from Suits’s words on play to some other
recent words, written by, respectively, Colin McGinn, a very fine
philosopher; Diane Ackerman, a very fine essayist and poet; and
Stuart Brown, a very fine (I presume) medical doctor, psychiatrist,
and clinical researcher. First is a comment from McGinn, in a book
about sport and a discussion of his attempt to improve his tennis
game:
Certainly, tennis, like other sports, is a form of play. . . . Play is a vital
part of any full life, and a person who never plays is worse than a “dull
boy”: he or she lacks imagination, humour and a proper sense of value.
Only the bleakest and most life-denying Puritanism could warrant
deleting all play from human life. . . . Play is part of what makes human
life worthwhile, and we should seek to get as much out of it as we can.6

In a beautiful book-length meditation on “deep play,” the most
deeply absorbing and “ecstatic” form of play, Diane Ackerman
writes:
The spirit of deep play is central to the life of each person, and also to
society, inspiring the visual, musical, and verbal arts; exploration and
4
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discovery; war; law; and other elements of culture we’ve come to cherish (or dread). . . .
This book is not a conclusion but an exploration. It invites you to
look closely at the human saga, and consider how much of it revolves
around play. . . . Indeed, it’s our passion for deep play that makes us the
puzzling and at times resplendent beings we are.7

Finally, Stuart Brown, founder of the National Institute on Play,
expresses thoughts based on forty years of conducting play studies
and taking more than six thousand “play histories” of all kinds of
people:
I have found that remembering what play is all about and making it
part of our daily lives are probably the most important factors in being
a fulfilled human being. . . .
I don’t think it is too much to say that play can save your life. It certainly has salvaged mine. Life without play is a grinding, mechanical existence organized around doing things necessary for survival. Play is the stick
that stirs the drink. It is the basis of all art, games, books, sports, movies,
fashion, fun, and wonder—in short, the basis of what we think of as civilization. Play is the vital essence of life. It is what makes life lively. . . .
The world needs play because it enables each person to live a good
life.8

The contrast between Suits’s attitude and approach and these
enthusiastic claims about the value of play is noteworthy. When
Suits considers play, he thinks there is much less there than meets
the eye. He offers a tidy conceptual analysis that attempts to deflate
the Huizingian notion that there is “play under nearly every rock
in the social landscape.” On the other hand, these contemporary
playologists (if I may coin a term) do see the pervasive influence
and importance of play in human life. Huizinga was right, they tell
us. Play is under a lot of rocks. Diane Ackerman makes the influence of Huizinga explicit: “From time to time, this book becomes
a fantasia on a theme by Huizinga, in which I play with some of his
A Pluralist Conception of Play
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ideas, amplify them, follow their shadows and nuances.” Brown
gets no further than chapter 2 before he brings his own “foundational definition” into relation with Huizinga’s famous discussion.
Although McGinn does not explicitly mention Huizinga, his comments about entering a magical world with its own rules and goals,
play and seriousness, freedom, and ridding ourselves of ordinary
existence are well-known elements in Huizinga’s analysis.9 One
problem with Suits’s approach is this: Should we accept his definition, we would have no idea, based on his account, why so much
has been made of making a “temporary reallocation to autotelic
activities of resources primarily committed to instrumental activities.” We are left in the dark about the common forms and experiences of activities that typically involve such reallocation and why
our neo-Huizingians value it so highly.
Now contrast Suits’s definition with Huizinga’s frequently cited
words on play summarizing his account. (This will be a useful reference for the following discussion.)
Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free
activity standing quite consciously outside “ordinary” life as being “not
serious,” but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly.
It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can
be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time
and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the formation of social groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy and to stress their difference from the common
world by disguise or other means.
. . . Play is a voluntary activity or occupation executed within certain fixed limits of time and place, according to rules freely accepted
but absolutely binding, having its aim in itself and accompanied by a
feeling of tension, joy and the consciousness that it is “different” from
“ordinary life.”¹0

It is evident from this brief overview of claims about play that
there are different approaches to the study, description, and evalu6
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ation of play. Undoubtedly, there is a startling diversity of phenomena associated with play. A noted scholar of play, Brian SuttonSmith, refers to the “ambiguity of play” in his important book, but
he is most interested in what he calls “the ideological underpinnings
of play theories.” My focus will be on the attempt to understand
the diversity of play phenomena rather than the diversity of play
scholarship and what he calls the “rhetorics,” or rhetorical underpinnings, of different theories of play.¹¹
ii. Approaches to Play
A.

Play as Behavior or Action
Diane Ackerman begins her book by saying, “Everyone understands
play.” In one sense that is not quite right, because there is considerable controversy about the question of definition. We can, however, wield the concept and recognize paradigm cases of play. That
is because play is initially categorized as a kind of behavior. It is
something we can see or observe. It has been and continues to be
extensively studied by scientists who are interested in both animal
and human play. My son picks up our dog’s chew toy, and she
immediately perks up, exhibits the “play bow,” paws outstretched
on the floor with her rump raised in the air, and wants the toy to
be thrown, after which she sprints to the toy, then coyly brings it
back, waiting for it to be tossed again. Chimps exhibit a “play face,”
analogous to the look of the joyous, smiling faces of children playing at the playground, running, jumping, skipping—spontaneous,
improvisational, vigorous, unrestrained. Scientists tell us that play
is prominent throughout the animal kingdom, not just in mammals. We are told that “animal play researchers have established
specific criteria that define play behavior,” and that “most species
have 10 to 100 distinct play signals that they use to solicit play or
to reassure one another during play-fighting that it’s still all just
fun.”¹² In more primitive forms, play is pure movement and
motion, for no apparent reason. When animals are playing in the
wild, they are not looking for food or being attentive to threats
A Pluralist Conception of Play
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from the environment. When children are playing, they are not
living under the constraints of material needs or desires. They are
“just playing,” freely and exuberantly. They appear to be enjoying
themselves immensely, like the two juvenile grizzly bears in the
Alaskan wilderness observed by Stuart Brown and Bob Fagen, an
expert on animal play behavior. Brown asks why the bears are playing. Fagen replies, “Because it’s fun.” Brown says, “No, Bob, I mean
from a scientific point of view.”¹³
The exchange between the two is interesting because it both
separates and connects the notions of animal behavior and human
activity, or play as behavior and play as activity. Play behavior in
animals is “apparently purposeless,” as biologists claim.¹4 When
animals are playing, they are not, apparently, engaged in any kind
of instrumental activity associated with their survival needs. Their
play may be “fun,” as the animal behavior scientist claims, but there
must be something biologically deeper going on. Because of the
prevalence of play in animals there is the presumption that there
must be some adaptive advantage associated with play behavior.
This generates scientific theories about the biological usefulness of
“apparently” biologically useless behavior. When pushed, Fagen
says, “In a world continuously presenting unique challenges and
ambiguity, play prepares these bears for an evolving planet.”¹5 Other
scientists have added to or revised the play-as-preparation hypothesis, arguing that play contributes to neural development (the
growth of the cerebellum and the development of the brain’s frontal cortex) and more flexible and responsive brains.¹6
When we turn to human play, especially the play of children,
we can ask the same sort of questions about such behavior. Play is
unproductive, insofar as it is not obviously pursued for the sake of
satisfying material needs. It seems as wasteful and superfluous as
animal play, a useless squandering of energy. We are animals, of
course, so play can be studied from the standpoint of understanding the paradox of behavior that is both apparently useless yet has
some adaptive advantages. But behavior may now be thought of
8
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as action, which humans may explicitly and self-consciously choose
to engage in at least at some point in development. It is still preconscious and preverbal in certain contexts and to a certain developmental stage, as Brown says,¹7 and extremely varied, but now it
may be approached in terms of its unique phenomenology, which
is described as extending from children to adults. The concept of
“apparent purposelessness” in animal behavior leaves open the issue
of play’s biological usefulness and allows the scientist to speculate
about animal psychology. The bears certainly appeared to be having fun. For human play, the concept of “apparent purposelessness”
leads naturally to the issue of what it means to choose an action
for its own sake, or what it means to desire an activity as an end
rather than as a means to some further end. It leads inevitably to
considering psychological elements that are involved in playing,
that is, engaging in intrinsically valued activities.
B.

Play as Motive, Attitude, or State of Mind
For some philosophers of sport, like Bernard Suits (as we have seen)
and Klaus Meier, it is a bit of a truism to say that play essentially
involves an attitudinal component. The key to play is autotelicity,
engaging in activities for their own sake or as ends in themselves.
This involves the question of the de facto motives, reasons, or purposes involved when activities are undertaken. According to Suits,
play requires that an activity is valued for itself. Meier holds that
“autotelicity is both a necessary and sufficient trait” for play. As he
says, “I wish to provide a definition based on the orientation,
demeanor, or stance of the participants.” Play requires intrinsic
reasons, and if our reason (exclusive? predominant?) for doing whatever we choose to do is intrinsic to the activity, it is play. “Consequently, if games or sports are pursued voluntarily and for intrinsic
reasons, they are play forms; if they are pursued involuntarily or
engaged in predominantly for extrinsic rewards, they are not play
forms.”¹8 Angela Schneider echoes these views when she claims
that judging an activity to be play “is determined not by the nature
A Pluralist Conception of Play
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of the activity itself . . . but rather by the attitude of the player
toward the activity.” As she says, “Playing is not a type of activity,
but rather a mode of performing any activity.”¹9 These comments
distinguish play as an attitude (or having an essential attitudinal
component), and classifying an activity as play depends on the
context within which it is performed in specific circumstances,
rather than its structure.
This way of approaching play raises the issue of the relation
between claims about play as an activity and play as attitudinal.
Stuart Brown describes cases of golfers he has seen playing Pebble
Beach who, instead of enjoying the experience of playing one of
the most famous and spectacular golf courses in the world, transform what should be a highlight of their golfing experiences into
misery and unhappiness. Brown denies that they are playing. “They
are self-critical, competitive, perfectionistic, and preoccupied with
the last double bogey. These emotions don’t allow them to feel the
playful, out-of-time, in-the-zone, doing-it-for-its-own-sake sensation that accompanies joyful playfulness.” From our tennis matches
to our pickup basketball games, most of us have encountered the
tortured player whose misery and unhappiness infect all those with
whom he is playing. This leads Brown to say the following: “Sometimes running is play, and sometimes it is not. What is the difference between the two? It really depends on the emotions experienced by the runner. Play is a state of mind, rather than an
activity.”²0
This emphasis on the attitudinal component of play may be
misleading. It may lead to a confusion between an activity and an
attitude. To say that play “is a state of mind,” as Brown does, does
not really make sense if we interpret the claim literally. Play is an
activity that may or may not require a certain kind of attitude, but
the attitude is not the activity itself. Would it make sense to say
that we are playing when in fact we are doing nothing, perhaps
paralyzed in a drug-induced but affirmative haze of consciousness,
glad to be experiencing paralysis for its own sake? (Assume no “play
10
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of ideas” going on in the mind of person.) If a person were hooked
up to an experience machine (in Robert Nozick’s famous thought
experiment), electrodes attached to his brain, giving him mental
states (“experiences”) while he is floating like a blob in a tank, it
would make no sense to say that the person could be playing. (Let’s
say he is being fed the joyful experience of winning the U.S. Open
in golf.) It would make more sense to say that the person has playful attitudes, or the “state of mind” associated with play. The miserable golfers are doing something—they are playing golf, unhappily and without any joy. Better to say, as Suits, Meier, and
Schneider do, that play is an activity that requires a certain kind
of attitude, or is defined in terms of the attitude we take toward
the activity, that is, an activity engaged in as an end in itself or for
intrinsic reasons.
Despite the fact that many philosophers of sport take this position to be obvious, some puzzling questions arise. If autotelicity is
sufficient for play, as Meier insists, does this mean that we could,
in principle, transform any activity into play? Would Sisyphus’s
interminable rock rolling be magically transformed into play if the
gods injected a magic potion into his veins that caused him to
identify with his pointless toil? How about an apolitical functionary who spends his free time volunteering at Auschwitz, enjoying
the unpaid activity of marching the Jews to the gas chambers? Fun?
Is he playing? We may say that these activities are play for these
persons, but, at the least, it strikes us that these are not the kind of
activities that are either commonly or even appropriately categorized as play, as they would have to be if autotelicity were sufficient
for play. This raises the question of whether certain kinds of formal
requirements might be, if not necessary, at least typical and causally relevant for appropriateness. It would be helpful to be able to
say more about the form or structure of activities for which it would
be appropriate to have intrinsic reasons to perform them. Recall
Colin McGinn’s comment that tennis, like other sports, is a form
of play. If I understand his claim, he holds that tennis, as such, is
A Pluralist Conception of Play
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play, or sports, as such, are play activities. Suits finds these claims
to be ridiculous. He says, “I have never—anywhere—made, or even
entertained, the ridiculous assertions that some games or sports as
such are play or that some as such are not.”²¹ It is not clear to me
why it is ridiculous to assert that play activities may have formal
or structural requirements. It is also unclear what sort of argument
is offered for the view that autotelicity is necessary and sufficient
for play, other than the claim that it is just obvious in paradigm
cases. If the argument is ultimately a phenomenological one, the
phenomena require a more nuanced and thicker description.
This line of argument leads to questions about mixed motives.
Suits also seems to think it is obvious that when professional athletes are playing games, they are not really engaged in play because
they are being paid. They are working, not playing. As we will see,
they are engaged in activities that have a certain structure, but if
play requires autotelicity, professional game playing is instrumental, not autotelic. Furthermore, Suits offers the provocative thesis
that Olympic athletes, “amateurs” in some sense, are not playing
when participating in Olympic events, because they are acting under
a compulsion to win the gold medal rather than being motivated
to engage in their Olympic athletic activities simply for the sake of
participation. Pickup games are autotelic; highly competitive Olympic events are not. Suits says, “I am suggesting that acting under
such a compulsion, rather than the desire to win simply because
winning defines the activity one is undertaking, is what turns a
game that could be play into something that is not play.”²²
The problem is that when we engage in certain activities, we
may have a variety of motives. Even if autotelicity is necessary for
play, it is not clear why an activity that has some external end could
not also be desired for its own sake. Suppose I love to throw a rubber ball against a wall and catch it with my bare hands. I then
develop some rules. I throw at certain angles, at certain spots, with
certain velocities, and I see if I can catch the ball before it bounces
a specified number of times within a defined space. I establish a
12
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point system. I love playing wall ball! I tell my good friend how
much fun I have playing wall ball, and he joins me. We develop
our skills, play tense and competitive games, and deeply enjoy our
encounters. Our friends hear about wall ball and want to watch,
but we decide to make them pay for the pleasure of being spectators. Now we are professional wall ballers! We are admired. We
establish a league. More people want to watch . . . According to
Suits and many others, it makes no sense to ask whether wall ball,
as such, is a playful activity, since it depends on participants’ attitudes. Was wall ball transformed into “work” as soon as I was paid?
Suppose that I was extremely happy to be paid for playing wall
ball, grateful that I could play my game for money, and hopeful
that I could continue to play and that I never lost my love for the
game. In fact, my attitudes could be quite complex. My desires
could be characterized as conditional or hypothetical. I am happy
to be paid for playing wall ball, but I would play even if I did not
get paid.
Consider another example, somewhat closer to home. My job is
to teach and engage in philosophy. As an undergraduate I received
no compensation for this. As a graduate student I received a stipend
to study and teach. At one point philosophy became my job, my
work, yet doing philosophy is, in an important sense, something I
do for the immense satisfaction it gives me. It is valued as an end,
despite the fact that the activity can also be characterized instrumentally. It is something I would continue to do whether or not I
am paid to do it. My motives are mixed; my attitudes are complex.²³
Play is attitudinally more complex than Suits and others seem
to think. Consider another aspect of this complexity. Wall ball, like
other games, is strictly conventional. It is made-up. Its rules are
imaginative constructions that are the conditions for a certain kind
of activity to occur, that is, conditions for playing wall ball. It is
not work, art, science, religion, poetry, war, or anything else. As
Huizinga says, “It’s not ‘ordinary’ or ‘real’ life. It is rather a stepping out of ‘real’ life into a temporary sphere of activity with a
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disposition all of its own.” He is talking about play. I am talking
about wall ball as a form of play. Huizinga continues by giving the
example of the young child playing “trains,” pretending that chairs
are something else than “real life,” and urging Daddy to act accordingly. He says, “This ‘only pretending’ quality of play betrays a
consciousness of the inferiority of play compared with ‘seriousness,’
a feeling that seems to be something as primary as play itself.” Here
I would speak of a distinctive attitude toward playful activities.
They are not “serious,” yet they can be wholly absorbing and
engaged in quite seriously. I have called such an attitude “serious
nonseriousness.”²4 Even professional athletes are sometimes pushed
in times of crisis to admit the “nonserious” character of their activity. A young Major League Baseball pitcher is killed in a car crash.
One of his teammates sadly comments, “This is real life, not baseball.” The attitude taken by the professional baseball player is essentially related to the form or structure of the activity, as if such an
attitude is appropriate because baseball, as such, is not “real life.”
Play is structurally nonserious.
One other element of attitudinal complexity is important. When
the scientist is asked why the bears play, he says, “Because it’s fun.”
We may not be sure about bear phenomenology, but when we
consider the play of children and adults, when we think of our
youthful and grown-up play, it is natural to speak of fun, joy, enjoyment, or satisfaction. Brown says his miserable golfers did not feel
the “playful, out-of-time, in-the-zone, doing-it-for-its-own-sake
sensation [emphasis added] that accompanies joyful playfulness.”
The pleasure of play, however, is not like the pleasure of sensations
in which we take delight—the pleasurable sounds, tastes, smells,
and feel of ordinary experiences, such as the pleasurable sensation
of orgasm. Fred Feldman’s recent defense of hedonism makes
explicit what has been implicit in important historical accounts of
the value and kinds of pleasure, including Epicurus’s account of
the good life. Feldman distinguishes sensory pleasure and attitudinal pleasure. Sensory pleasures are feelings, that is, pleasurable sen14
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sations. Attitudinal pleasures need not be felt. “A person takes
attitudinal pleasure in some state of affairs if he enjoys it, is pleased
by it, is glad that it is happening, is delighted by it.” Feldman gives
the example of a person being pleased by the fact that there are no
wars going on in the world. I may be pleased by Barack Obama’s
being elected president, or I may enjoy the company of a good
friend. Attitudinal pleasures are intentional, and they need not have
the “feel” of sensations. “We know we have them not by sensation,
but in the same way (whatever it may be) that we know when we
believe something, or hope for it, or fear that it might happen.”²5
(These are propositional attitudes.)
For many, sport is a rich source of attitudinal pleasure. It was for
me. It is also clear that there is a close relationship between enjoying an activity and desiring to engage in it for its own sake. If we
add that certain kinds of activities are such that their form or structure occasions an attitudinal recognition of being set apart from
“real life,” then we have arrived at a more complex attitudinal
account of play, whose elements may have an equal claim in locating or categorizing an activity as play. Why shouldn’t we take the
attitudinal recognition of the conventional nature of certain kinds
of activities as sufficient for play? But now more needs to be said
about the formal or structural elements in play activities. Whatever
other motives or attitudes a person might have, if an activity is
enjoyed, attitudinally recognized as not “real life,” and intrinsically
attractive, regardless of other motives, then there are good reasons
to categorize it as play—independent of whether a person is also
being paid to perform the activity.
C.

Play as Form or Structure
The emphasis on form or structure redirects our attention to features of the activity itself rather than the subjectivity of the player.
It also makes way for an approach that emphasizes relational elements or the interplay between subjectivity and features of the
activity. The emphasis on form or structure—here, lack of form or
A Pluralist Conception of Play
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structure—first appeared in the description of animal behavior and
children’s play as improvisational and spontaneous rather than
mechanical and determined. Suits distinguishes primitive play—the
baby splashing water in the bathtub—and sophisticated play, which
involves rules and the development of skills. Kenneth Schmitz categorizes play in terms of a continuum from the least formal to the
most formal types: frolic, make-believe, sporting skills, and games.
Play need not be formal, but it often is. It is especially the gamelike
elements of formal play that are relevant when considering whether
it is reasonable to claim that sports or games as such are play—
despite the fact that Suits and others may believe such assertions
are “ridiculous.” This is because it is plausible to claim, as Suits does,
that “the elements of sport are essentially—although perhaps not
totally—the same as elements of game.”²6
Suits’s insightful and familiar account of the elements of playing
games provides the basis for an emphasis on play as activity having
a certain form or structure and the claim that sport as such is activity having this structure. First, games are means-ends activities;
they have a structure in which means are related to ends in a specified manner. There are goals that may be described independently
of the respective games, like a golf ball coming to rest in a cup, a
basketball going through a hoop, a soccer ball entering a netted
goal, or a football being carried beyond a certain point. But these
goals may be brought about in a variety of ways. I may place the
golf ball in the cup with my hand, climb a ladder to put the basketball through a hoop, and so forth. Games are developed when
means are limited by specific rules that prescribe and proscribe the
ways in which goals may be brought about, transforming prelusory
goals (pregame goals) into lusory ends (ends intrinsic to the game),
one of which is to win the game by achieving certain lusory goals.
Since the means specified by the rules always rule out the most
efficient way to achieve a prelusory goal, games are quite unlike
real life, in which efficiency is often the hallmark of rationality.
Hence, because of their structure, games do require an attitude that
16
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allows for the injection of gratuitous difficulty into life simply for
the sake of the occurrence of the activity itself. Suits summarizes
the elements of playing games in the following definition: “To play
a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs (pre-lusory
goal), using only means permitted by rules (lusory means), where
the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favor of less efficient
means (constitutive rules), and where such rules are accepted just
because they make possible such activity (lusory attitude). I also
offer the following only approximately accurate, but more pithy,
version of the above definition: Playing a game is the voluntary
attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.”²7
To say, as Huizinga does, that play is not “ordinary” or “real life,”
or to claim, as Roger Caillois does, that play is both “separate” and
“unproductive,” is to acknowledge a formal or structural feature of
play.²8 Formal play, by its very nature, is not instrumental, in the
sense in which instrumentality is understood in everyday life. To
say that play is “superfluous,” as Huizinga does, or to claim that
playing games involves gratuitous difficulty or the overcoming of
unnecessary obstacles, affirms the difference between a world of
play, with its own meanings—its own requirements and delimitations of space or time—and ordinary life. To say that games are
not “serious” is to equivocate, unless it is clear that nonseriousness
may be a claim about either the structure of the activity or the attitude of the player. Caillois says, “The confused and intricate laws
of ordinary life are replaced in this fixed space and for this given
time, by precise, arbitrary, unexceptionable rules that must be
accepted as such and that govern the correct playing of the game.”²9
When the professional baseball player speaks of death as a part of
“real life” compared to baseball (not “real life”), he is recognizing
the difference between ordinary means-ends activities in life and
the structure of formal play, that is, the playing of games. Some
play is improvisational and joyous; other forms of play express our
attraction to gratuitous difficulty and the value we place on overcoming obstacles, even unnecessary ones. And many complex forms
A Pluralist Conception of Play
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of play may well involve both: bursts of speed, creative physical
movements, and spontaneity within the limits of the rules of the
game or activity.³0
Suits ends one of his influential essays on sport, play, and game
by referring to a New Yorker cartoon in which an angry golfer is
saying something to his partner: “The caption reads, ‘Stop saying
it’s just a game! Goddamit, it’s not just a game!’ And he is quite
right. For him, golf is not play, and so it is not, therefore just a
game.”³¹ I would say that Suits’s comment misleadingly reduces
play to activity defined merely in terms of an attitude, ignores the
formal aspects of the game of golf that are relevant in determining
its character as play, and diminishes the experiential complexity of
the activity, which may also be relevant in our judgments about
play. For me, the cartoon suggests that the golfer has a rather shallow appreciation of the playful possibilities that are available in the
experience of playing golf—at least in this particular example. How
are such possibilities described?
D.

Play as Meaningful Experience
When we conceive of play as a certain kind of attitude that can be
intentionally directed toward any kind of activity (object), or we
think of play activity itself as having a certain form or structure, it
is as if we are focusing on two poles or aspects of experience that
are importantly related or whose interplay constitutes a richer
account of play phenomena. For many descriptions of the features
of play it is less misleading to speak of the lived experience of the
player interacting with her environment or becoming experientially
involved with something other than herself. When different aspects
of play experience are described, at least some of these features are
at the same time both formal elements of the activity and psychological features of the agent. To say that play is “uncertain,” as Caillois does, describes both the course of undetermined events and the
experience of the tension of not knowing what will happen or who
will win. For these approaches, a dualism that abstractly separates
18
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subject and object is phenomenologically inadequate, although
some features may seem to focus more on one aspect of playful
involvement than another. In the following, I will mention various
characteristics of play without taking the time to offer an extended
analysis of each feature—which would require considerable space.
My procedure illustrates the difference between a focus on attitude
or state of mind, which subjectivizes play, and experiential properties that are occasioned by involvements that require an account of
that with which one is involved or which cannot be reduced simply
to states of mind. After mentioning various characteristics, I will
refer to some lists of properties, including Huizinga’s (as we have
seen) and Caillois’s, to make the discussion more manageable.
First, here are some features of play that have been emphasized
and analyzed in the expansive literature on the subject: play is activity characterized by freedom, separateness, nonseriousness, illusion,
unreality, delimitation of space and time, isolation, purposelessness, order, make-believe, a play world, superfluousness, suspension
of the ordinary, internal or intrinsic meaning, inherent attraction,
unalienated participation, internal purposiveness, serious nonseriousness, diminished consciousness of self, unselfing, absorption,
responsive openness, attunement, experience of difficulty, overcoming obstacles, risk taking, finitude, narrative structure, unity, contingency, possibility, uncertainty, spontaneity, improvisation—and
fun. I am sure I have not exhausted the possibilities!
Recall Huizinga’s summary definition in which each part is significant and analyzed at some length. Huizinga insists that all “play
means something,” and later states, “We shall try to take play as
the player himself takes it: in its primary significance.” When we
attend to the experience of play, parsimonious descriptions are
impossible because of the experiential richness of these activities.
The freedom of play is both attitudinal, in which a player deeply
enjoys engaging in such activities, and experiential, in which
involvement with a wholly conventional play world separates a
player from the cares of ordinary life. The experience of “secludedA Pluralist Conception of Play
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ness,” “isolation,” or even “tension” is the experience of structure,
and it is attitudinally significant. “Experience” describes the abundant unity of meaningful activity (movement) and valuable intentional attitudes. Likewise, Caillois’s list of the essential properties
of play is best interpreted as an attempt to describe the essential
experiences involved in the playing of games: play is free (not obligatory), separate (limited in space and time), uncertain (outcomes
are not determined in advance and are due to players’ innovations),
unproductive (no new goods are created), governed by rules (conventional suspension of ordinary norms), and make-believe (an
awareness of the unreality of the play world).³²
Although Stuart Brown claims at one point in his interesting
recent book that play is a “state of mind,” when he initially and
tentatively offers a “foundational definition” of play, in large part
for heuristic reasons, the properties he mentions richly combine
claims about movement, attitude, structure, and experience. Here
are the properties he lists, along with a brief description of each:
t apparently purposeless (done for its own sake)
t voluntary (“not obligatory or required by duty”)
t inherent attraction (“It’s fun. It makes you feel good. . . . It’s
a cure for boredom.”)
t freedom from time (“When we are fully engaged in play, we
lose a sense of the passage of time.”)
t diminished consciousness of self (“We stop worrying about
whether we look good or awkward, smart or stupid. . . . We
are fully in the moment, in the zone.”)
t improvisational potential (“We aren’t locked into a rigid way
of doing things. We are open to serendipity, to change. . . .
The result is that we stumble upon new behaviors, thoughts,
strategies, movements, or ways of being.”)
t continuation desire (“We desire to keep doing it, and the pleasure of the experience drives the desire. We find ways to keep
it going. . . . And when it is over, we want to do it again.”)³³
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Parts of Brown’s list of properties are quite familiar after having
considered briefly the seminal accounts of play found in Huizinga
and Caillois. Some of the properties add additional or even new
insights when we consider the experiential richness of play. The
absorption described by Huizinga becomes “diminished consciousness of self ” as players are fully involved in the activity of cycling,
windsurfing, tennis, and the like. Improvisational potential connects the frolic of animals and children to the openness and free
play of possibilities in rule-governed play. The category of improvisation describes the phenomenology of movement, a certain kind
of kinesthetic freedom. Continuation desire is connected to attitudinal pleasure and the structure of repetition emphasized by Huizinga: “In this faculty of repetition lies one of the most essential
qualities of play.”³4 Games begin, are played out, even end, only
to be repeated by players who want to continue playing, over and
over. When Brown speaks of freedom from time, the language is
experiential rather than structural. Time is experienced differently
because the time internal to the game—due to the way that the
game is temporally articulated according to rules—is often quite
different from ordinary clock time. Play time starts and stops,
speeds up and slows down, extends limitlessly, or is extinguished.
Or, when we are absorbed in the activity, “in the moment,” we lose
our sense of the flow of time even when the activity itself is not
articulated in terms of innings, periods, quarters, and so on.
A final approach to play deserves to be mentioned because the
notion of play as meaningful experience, which unifies the different approaches to play as activity, attitude, and form, may be a
derivative notion, dependent on an ontologically distinctive account
of play that makes experiential accounts metaphorical rather than
literal.
E.

Play as an Ontologically Distinctive Phenomenon
In Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer is not primarily interested in the concept of play. He is centrally concerned with the
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question of truth and understanding in the human sciences. He
attempts to give an account of hermeneutical consciousness that
describes the proper role of the historicity of existence in human
understanding. Gadamer’s discussion of play is merely a moment
in his attempt to provide an analysis of aesthetic experience, an
analysis that itself is a part of his monumental account of an experience of truth that cannot be reduced to scientific methods of
understanding. Gadamer says, “The experience of the work of art
includes understanding, and thus represents a hermeneutical phenomenon—but not at all in the sense of a scientific method.”³5
His account of play is, however, significant.
Gadamer claims that play has its own mode of being and that
play cannot be explained simply in terms of the subjectivity of the
player. “Play has its own essence, independent of the consciousness
of those who play.” Gadamer argues that play is analogous to the
way in which a work of art is fulfilled in the aesthetic experience
of a spectator and is the real “subject” of the experience. Play
requires a player with a certain attitude in order to come into being,
but play is not reducible to the player’s attitude; “play merely reaches
presentation (Darstellung) through the players.” For Gadamer, when
we attend to apparently metaphorical usages of “play,” when we
speak of the play of light, waves, or natural forces, “what is intended
is to-and-fro movement that is not tied to any goal which would
bring it to an end.” It is a mistake to think that these usages are
figurative whereas our references to human or animal play are literal. The subject of play is play itself, not the subjectivity of the
player. “Play clearly represents an order in which the to-and-fro
movement of play follows of itself. It is part of play that the movement is not only without goal or purpose, but also without effort.”
The experience of freedom from the strains of ordinary life is the
result of play playing itself through the player. “The structure of
play absorbs the player into itself, and thus frees him from the burden of taking the initiative, which constitutes the actual strain of
existence.” For Gadamer, the mode of being of play is a “pure self22
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representation.” Nature, in its unceasing, purposeless movement,
renewing itself in “constant repetition,” also exemplifies the being
of mobility as self-representation. “Thus in this sphere it becomes
finally meaningless to distinguish between literal and metaphorical
usage.”³6
If Gadamer’s approach seems unduly opaque and metaphysically
obscure, consider the claim that his approach to play helps clarify
the “playful character of the contest.” For those who deny that
contests or competitive games can be play, he reminds us that
“through the contest arises the tense to-and-fro movement from
which the victor emerges, and thus the whole becomes a game.”³7
Gadamer’s ontological approach clarifies the ordinary view that
players (or spectators, for that matter) can develop a love or respect
for “the game” as an independent phenomenon that is, in a sense,
larger than the players, just as aesthetic appreciation or aesthetic
experience recognizes the autonomy of a work of art standing over
against the aesthetic consciousness as a demanding and authoritative presence.³8 The game or the work of art constitutes a reality
in itself. “In cases where human subjectivity is what is playing, the
primacy of the game over the players engaged in it is experienced
by the players themselves in a special way.” Gadamer’s comment
reflects the development of our discussion of the metaphysics of
play, in which the subjective approach to play is corrected by references to form or structure. Gadamer’s remarks ring true, both phenomenologically and ontologically, when he comments that the
“attraction of a game, the fascination it exerts, consists precisely in
the fact that the game masters the players.” The player gives herself
over to the game, or, if there is some dispute about speaking of a
“game” in terms of the development of certain sporting skills, the
player is taken up by her enjoyable experience of confronting gratuitous difficulties (or unnecessary obstacles). When the game is
played, the “real subject of the game . . . is not the player, but
instead the game itself. What holds the player in its spell, draws
him into play, and keeps him there is the game itself.” Attitudes
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are intentionally related to the nature of the task required for playing the game. “One can say that performing a task successfully
‘presents it’ (stellt sie dar).” Hence, we again arrive at the notion
that playing games (or overcoming unnecessary obstacles), insofar
as they are purposeless, that is, ends in themselves, shows that “play
is really limited to presenting itself. Thus its mode of being is selfpresentation.”³9
Gadamer summarizes his approach to play: “We have seen that
play does not have its being in the player’s consciousness or attitude, but on the contrary play draws him into its dominion and
fills him with its spirit. The player experiences the game as a reality
that surpasses him.” Gadamer affirms the supposedly “ridiculous”
notion that sport, as such, conceived broadly as game playing (in
Suits’s own sense), is play, ontologically interpreted as presenting
itself in the tasks defined by the “make-believe goals of the game,”
in Gadamer’s words.40 Gadamer’s account of play returns us to the
first approach or moment in our discussion, when play is taken to
be behavior or action, some observable natural phenomenon characterized, much as Gadamer describes, as spontaneous and purposeless “to-and-fro movement.” The scientist then explains the
phenomena biologically or in terms of neural development, the
social scientist or humanist explains it in human terms, and we are
led, dialectically, down a path that leads to Gadamer’s interpretation of the original phenomena, in which play is “decentered” and
taken to be ontologically distinctive, manifested in and through
natural events, animals, children, and adults.4¹
Now we are in a position to bring these approaches together in
order to offer some conclusions about the nature of play, its relation to sport, and its value and role in a good human life.
iii. Play, Pluralism, and Good Lives
We began our discussion by attending to some of Bernard Suits’s
“words on play.” Suits, always playfully provocative, voiced suspicions about attempts “to find play under nearly every rock in the
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social landscape,” expressed doubts about those who make so much
of the notion, offered his own attempt to place strict boundaries
on the concept, and acknowledged that figurative uses of the word
play force us to explain the relevant similarities and differences
involved when we speak of the “play of light,” the “playful dog,”
“child’s play,” “playing a game,” and “playing professional sports.”
The upshot of our examination of approaches to play is evident.
It is no wonder that play is found under nearly every rock in the
social landscape, given the multiplicity of possible approaches and
the legitimacy of each to tell us something important, even if
incomplete, about the concept of play. Each approach picks out
relevant properties generated by taking a certain descriptive or
explanatory perspective on play phenomena. Each may claim to
be a total account of play only by ignoring the legitimacy of other
perspectives. Because of the plurality of the ways we can approach
play, each should be taken to be a significant contribution to a
nonreductive account of play.
The new prophets of play, Brown, Ackerman, and others, attempt
to rouse us out of the doldrums of ordinary existence by awakening (or reawakening) in us moments of joy, exuberance, creativity,
spontaneity, freedom, optimism, and fun—often associated with
activities that are usually a part of early life but somehow get lost
along the way. In attempting to enliven us to the possibilities of
playful experience, they connect play to a notion of a good human
life. Recall the initial comments by McGinn, Brown, and Ackerman. McGinn’s comments on play are secondary; they arise in an
intellectual memoir that is robust and confessional about the role
of sports and games in his life, from childhood and adolescence
through adulthood: marbles, trampolining, diving, pole vaulting,
table tennis, bowling, pinball, fishing, squash, running, video
games, lifting weights, skiing, kayaking, windsurfing, and tennis!
Of course sport is play, he tells us. Brown and Ackerman are most
interested in play, not sport, yet both assume in some of their comments that sporting activities are playful activities. Sport should be
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placed in the context of play and living well—joyously, freely, creatively. They call us to the possible enchantment of moments of
our lives, when we are captivated by the absorbing activities that
enable us to transcend everyday life, to “suspend the ordinary,” as
Kenneth Schmitz described the “essence” of play.4²
So, is sport an expression of play? Should we understand sport
in terms of the concept of play? As far as I can tell, there are two
primary reasons given for resisting the relationship, one of which
we have already examined. Both avenues of criticism claim that
sport may be infected by desires that are incompatible with play.
Many claim, as Suits does, that play for pay is not really play, that
professional sport is instrumental rather than autotelic. As we have
seen, this view falls prey to the problem of mixed motives and
involves the reduction of play to attitudinal considerations, ignoring the relevance of other properties, both structural and experiential. Activities may be characterized in complex ways, and the
rejection of professional sport as play on attitudinal grounds hides
the ways in which such activities have playlike properties. Moreover, even if Suits and others are right about the dissociation of
professional sport and play, in numerous instances in which people
play sports, the activities embody many properties that are associated with play: freedom, separateness, absorption, purposelessness,
and so on.
The other avenue of criticism stresses the role of the desire to
win in sports, rather than the extent to which sporting activities
may be infected by elements that make sports one’s work or profession. Suits also argues that the compulsion to win, even for supposed amateurs like Olympic athletes, is incompatible with the
notion that play must be engaged in as an end in itself. The stronger version of this criticism comes from Alfie Kohn, who insists
that any desire to win, not simply an overarching compulsion, disqualifies an activity from being play. For Kohn, play and competition are incompatible. Since sport, by its very nature, involves
competition, sport and play are incompatible. Because play involves
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the familiar idea of choosing an activity for its own sake, play can
have “no goal other than itself.” Competition is rule governed, often
extrinsically motivated (by the desire for social approval), and goal
oriented (a product orientation), rather than being a “process orientation.” Therefore, because sport is competitive, “sports never
really qualified as play in the first place. Although it is not generally acknowledged, most definitions of play do seem to exclude
competitive activities.”4³
Kohn is undoubtedly correct to emphasize the dangers of competition, and the metaphor he uses is apt: “Clearly competition
and play tug in two different directions. If you are trying to win,
you are not engaged in true play.”44 Yet there is more insight in his
view when he resorts to metaphor than when he engages in essentialist pronouncements. There is no essence of play. If we recognize
the multiplicity of relevant considerations involved when we
attempt to understand play phenomena, we should resist Kohn’s
view that play can be neither competitive nor rule governed. To
say that play cannot be rule governed seems to reduce playful activities to frolic. However, there are more or less formal modes of play
that many have pointed out. Rules may be formulated to create
noncompetitive games (leapfrog) or games in which there is an
internal goal (winning) sought by participants if they intend to
engage in the activity. To say that play cannot be “goal oriented”
either reduces it to frolic or equivocates on the notion of the “goal”
of the activity in question. Certainly, playing a game, attempting
to overcome unnecessary obstacles, or freely confronting gratuitous
difficulty may be engaged in for the sake of the activity, even if the
activity has an internal end that cannot be shared by the victor and
the vanquished. Also, overcoming obstacles within the game means
that sport, construed as game playing or skills development, is “goal
oriented.” The process itself has internal products. The process may
or may not also have extrinsic motives, but those considerations
must be placed along with others that count for or against our
judgment about the way to categorize certain activities.
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In the end, if we are reminded of the multiple approaches to play
and the varieties of usages, both literal and figurative, that are
involved when we refer to the concept of play, we are left with a
framework within which to sort out relevant similarities and differences when we speak in terms related to play. I do not think that
a pluralist account of play leaves things too open-ended, nor do I
think that there are no constraints on what we call play. No doubt
such an account does leave things more messy than Suits’s essentialism suggests, but that is because of the complexity of the phenomena and the nature of the concept of play. Given what we have
said about the variety of approaches to play, the fecundity of play
phenomena, and the connection between play and a good human
life, we should reinforce, whenever it is appropriate, the notion
that sport is found in the neighborhood of play. And we should do
this in order to encourage the enchanting possibilities of sport,
play, and life itself. When we find that sport has strayed from its
natural home, we must encourage the wayward child to come back
from the world.
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